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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 930104-CA
Priority No. 2

TIMOTHY G. GARCIA,
De fendant/Appe11ant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1987 & Supp. 1991), and Utah R.
Crim. P. 26(2)(a), whereby a defendant in a district court criminal
action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final
judgment and conviction for any crime other than a first degree or
capital felony.

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or
in the Addendum:
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32a-2
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court's order of restitution, which was
incurred by a governmental investigatory agency before the filing of
a criminal Information, was improper and contrary to statutory
authority, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201; 77-32a-2, and existing
caselaw.

See State v. Depaoli, 835 P.2d 162 (Utah 1992).
"[The defendant's sentence [may be] remanded for

resentencing 'because of the clear error in the original
[sentence].,,f

State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 473-74 n.5 (Utah App.

1991) (citing State v. Babbelf 770 P.2d 987, 994 (Utah 1989)); see
also State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991) ("trial courts
do not have discretion to misapply the law"); State v. Swapp, 808
P.2d 115, 120 (Utah App.) ("When examining a trial court's
interpretation of a statutory provision we apply a correction of
error standard"), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991); Grayson
Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989) ("A trial
court's legal conclusions are accorded no particular deference").
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
"Unlawful Distribution, Offering, Agreeing, Consenting or Arranging
to Distribute a Controlled" Substance, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), -(8)(1)(b)(i)
(1992), and pursuant to a plea bargain, in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Timothy R. Hansen, presiding.
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On December 21, 1992,

Mr. Garcia pleaded guilty to the above charge, (R 16-22), and the
State dismissed another allegation.

(R 16).

On January 29, 1993, the trial court sentenced Mr. Garcia
to an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison (to be served concurrently with an unrelated sentence) and
ordered him to pay a $1600 fine (plus surcharge).

(R 26, 49). The

court also ordered him to pay $240 in restitution to Metro
Narcotics.

Other statements relevant to this section are stated

elsewhere in the brief.

See infra Statement of the Facts.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On November 2, 1992, the State filed an Information against
Mr. Garcia alleging two separate counts of "Unlawful Distribution,
Offering, Agreeing, Consenting or Arranging to Distribute a
Controlled" Substance, both second degree felonies.

(R 06).

The

charges contained virtually identical allegations with the exception
of the date in question.

As part of the plea bargain negotiations,

the State agreed to dismiss one of the counts in exchange for a
guilty plea to the other remaining charge.

(R 16).

At sentencing, the parties did not dispute that Metro
Narcotics used $480 in their undercover sting operation.

(R 44).

However, counsel for Mr. Garcia requested the trial court to not
impose the $480 as restitution because "that's a cost of
prosecution, Your Honor, and investigation[.]"

(R 44).

The State disagreed in part, explaining: "Your Honor, I
think he [Mr. Garcia] should be at least responsible for the
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restitution on the count he plead to.

If that's half of this

amount, $240.00, but I think that's money he should be responsible
for paying."

(R 48).

The trial court imposed sentence as follows:

"Inasmuch as

there's no agreement regarding restitution on count one,

I'm

satisfied that I do not have the option of ordering restitution as
to count one.

I will, however, order restitution on count two,

which is $240.00.
Force."

That restitution is to Metro Narcotics Strikes

(R 49) (footnote added).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court's order of restitution was improper.

"Metro Narcotics," the governmental investigatory agency, was not a
"victim" that suffered "pecuniary damages."

Instead, the money

expended by the agency—prior to the filing of the Information—
constituted nonrecoverable costs of investigation.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF RESTITUTION, MONEY EXPENDED
BY THE POLICE PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE INFORMATION,
CONSTITUTED NONRECOVERABLE COSTS OF INVESTIGATION
The trial court's authority to order restitution stems from
the sentencing statute which reads in pertinent part:
When a person is adjudged guilty of criminal activity
which has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition

1
Since the State dismissed count I, Mr. Garcia did not
"agree" to plead guilty to count I. His plea agreement only
required him to plead guilty to count II. (R 16-22).
- 4
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to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall
order that the defendant make restitution up to double
the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim . . .
unless the court in applying the criteria of
Subsection (3)(b) finds that restitution is
inappropriate.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(3)(a)(i) (emphasis added); see also State
v. Depaoli, 835 P.2d 162 (Utah 1992) (the "defense costs" statute,
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32a-2f should also be examined to determine the
validity of the restitution order).

As discussed below, the trial

court erred when it ordered Mr. Garcia to pay $240.00 in restitution
to the "Metro Strike Force."

(R 26, 49). Metro Narcotics was not a

"victim" in the case at bar.

See People v. Chaney, 544 N.E.2d 90

(111. App. 3 Dist. 1989) (citing People v. Evansf 461 N.E.2d 634
(111. App. 3 Dist. 1984)).
In Evans, the defendant argued "that the trial court
exceeded its sentencing authority in ordering restitution of $180 to
MEG [Multi-County Drug Enforcement Group]."

Id. at 639.

was "drug money" used in an undercover operation.

The $180

Id. at 636. But

cf. id. (a court imposed fine or forfeiture proceeding was proper).
The appellate court agreed, reasoning:
While certainly we would be remiss were we to hold
that unlawful delivery of a controlled substance is a
victimless crime, we would be blinking reality were we
not to acknowledge that many, if not most, offenders
are brought to justice through the efforts of
undercover agents making buys with public monies. We
will not, however, strain the commonly accepted
understanding of the word "victim" so as to include
the public drug enforcement agency, MEG, in the case
before us. Where public monies are expended in the
pursuit of solving crimes, the expenditure is part of
the investigating agency's normal operating costs.
- 5
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The governmental entity conducting an investigation is
not therefore considered a "victim" to the extent that
public monies are so expended.
Evans, 461 N.E.2d at 639 (emphasis added); accord United States v.
Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1980); State v. Jones, 724 P.2d 146
(Kan. App. 1986) (the State of Kansas is not a victim for purposes
of "investigative costs and costs of apprehension").
Like the $180 restitution payment improperly imposed in
Evans, see 461 N.E.2d at 639, the court here also illegally ordered
Timothy Garcia to pay $240 in restitution.

(R 26, 49). Mr. Garcia

respectfully requests this Court to correct the illegally imposed
portion of his sentence.

Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) ("The court may

correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal
manner, at any time"); State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86 (Utah 1991);
People v. Chaney, 544 N.E.2d 90 (111. App. 3 Dist. 1989) (citing
People v. Evans, 461 N.E.2d 634 (111. App. 3 Dist. 1984)).
The Utah Supreme Court has already implicitly rejected such
orders of restitution.

See State v. DePaoli, 835 P.2d 162 (Utah

1992) . At issue in Depaoli was whether the trial court erroneously
required the defendant to pay the cost of a "code R examination," an
amount expended by the Salt Lake City Police Department ("SLCPD")
for purposes of a rape investigation.

After examining

two relevant

statutory provisions, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (restitution) and
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32a-2 (defense costs), the Court determined that
the SLCPD did not fall within the definition of a "victim" because
the police suffered no "pecuniary damages."
at 164.
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Depaolif 835 P.2d

Noteworthy in Depaoli is the State's argument which was
rejected by our supreme court.

The State "argue[d], the SLCPD

'incurred a medical expense on behalf of the victim as a direct
result of the sexual assault, and thus, became a victim itself for
purposes of the restitution statute.'"

Id. at 164.

argument there is akin to the State's argument here.

The State's
The

restitution order here should also be rejected.
As is evident by the restitution order itself, neither the
court nor Metro Narcotics expected remuneration for drug
investigations.

(R 26, 49). On November 2, 1991, the State filed

an Information against Mr. Garcia, alleging two counts of unlawful
distribution of narcotics.

(R 6-8). However, the court's

restitution order only encompassed the $240 used for one of the
alleged drug transactions.

Metro Narcotics may have spent money on

the other alleged transaction, but no similar order of restitution
was entered.
In fact, the prosecutor below noted:

"Your Honor, I think

he [Mr. Garcia] should be at least responsible for the restitution
on the count he plead to.

If that's half of this amount, $240.00,

but I think that's money he should be responsible for paying."
(R 48).

Similarly, since Mr. Garcia did not agree to plead guilty

to count I, the trial court concluded that it "[did] not have the
option of ordering restitution as to count one.

I will, however,

order restitution on count two, which is $240.00. That restitution
is to Metro Narcotics Strikes Force."
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(R 49).

These statements, however, are contrary to the proper
interpretation of the applicable statutory authority and recently
decided caselaw.

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201; 77-32a-2; State v.

Depaoli, 835 P.2d 162 (Utah 1992).

The money constitutes

nonrecoverable "general damages," see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (not
pecuniary damages), which are not sought after civilly.
is simply "written off" as a cost of investigation.

The money

(R 6-8, 48, 49)

(after count I was dismissed, both the prosecutor and the trial
court declined to seek its recovery).
Consistent with this position is the Depaoli Court's
analysis of the "defense costs" statute:
Costs shall be limited to expenses specially incurred
by the state or any political subdivision thereof in
prosecuting the defendant, including attorney fees of
counsel assigned to represent the defendant pursuant
to Section 77-32-2 and investigators' fees. Costs
cannot include expenses inherent in providing a
constitutionally guaranteed trial or expenditures in
connection with the maintenance and operation of
government agencies that must be made by the public
irrespective of specific violations of law. Costs
cannot include attorneys' fees of prosecuting
attorneys or expenses incurred by the prosecution for
investigators or witnesses.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32a-2 (emphasis added), reprinted in, Depaoli,
835 P.2d at 164.
In holding that the cost of a code R examination could not
be recovered, the Depaoli Court reasoned "prosecution does not begin
until there is a named defendant who has been charged."
835 P.2d at 165.

Depaoli,

"[T]he cost of the examination was incurred by the
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prosecution in the course of the investigation and prior to the time
of the filing of the criminal information."

Id. at 165; see also

State v. Haynes, 53 Or. App. 850, 633 P.2d 38 (1981) (an opinion
whose reasoning was agreed upon by our supreme court).
Additionally, our [Utah's] statute contains a
provision not specifically contained in the Oregon
statute: "Costs cannot include attorneys' fees of
prosecuting attorneys or expenses incurred by the
prosecution for investigators or witnesses."
§ 77-32a-2. Since expenses incurred by the
prosecution for investigators are not allowed, it
logically follows that costs of investigation would
likewise be ineligible for restitution.
Depaoli, 835 P.2d at 165 (emphasis added).
Like the code R examination which was undoubtedly
"performed within hours of the sexual assault[,]" the $240 here
"changed hands" well before "the time of the filing of the criminal
information."

Cf. Depaoli, 835 P.2d at 165.

Consequently, Utah's

"defense costs" statute (particularly its last sentence), further
establishes that the trial court's $240 order of restitution was
improper.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-32a-2.
CONCLUSION

Mr. Garcia respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
trial court's order of restitution.
SUBMITTED this 7-T

day of May, 1993.

R0*|ALD S > FfJJINO

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that eight copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 27-

day of May/

1993.

RONALD S. "FUJINO

DELIVERED by
this

day of May, 1993.
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ADDENDUM

58-37-3. Prohibited acts — Penalties [Effective until J u l y
1. 1990J*
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person
to knowingly and intentionally:
(1) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub*
(iD distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
(uD possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of snbsrnnrm
listed in Schedules H through V except under an order or
tiorn or
(IT) possess a (Tingulled or counterfeit substance with intent to
uSStrxouse*
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection flXa) with respect to:
(3 a substance classified in Schedule I or H is guilty of a second
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree felony:
(iO a substance classified in Schedule HI or IV. or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second degree felony; or
Gii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony.

77-32a-2« Costs — What constitute.
Costs shall be limited to expenses specially incurred by the state or any
political subdivision thereof in prosecuting the defendant, including attorney
fees of counsel assigned to represent the defendant pursuant to Section
77-32-2 and investigators' fees. Costs cannot include expenses inherent in
providing a constitutionally guaranteed trial or expenditures in connection
with the maintenance and operation of government agencies that must be
made
by the public irrespective of specific violations of law. Costs cannot
inHTH» attorneys7 fees of prosecuting attorneys or expenses incurred by the
prosecution for investigators or witnesses.

Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two
nor more than 30 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not
be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to
present any information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in his absence, he
may likewise be sentenced in his absence, if a defendant fails to appear for
sentence, a warrant for his arrest may be issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of his right to appeal and the
time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or
prison and shall make his return on the commitment andfileit with the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner, at any time.

76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Definitions —
Resentencing — Aggravation or mitigation of
crimes with mandatory sentences.
(1) Provisions in this part concerning restitution do not limit or impair the
right of a person injured by a defendant's criminal activities to sue and recover damages from the defendant in a civil action. Evidence that the defendant has paid or been ordered to pay restitution under this part or Section
"-18-1, may not be introduced in any civil action arising out of the facts or
events which were the basis for the restitution. However, the court ^ a i i
credit any restitution paid by the defendant to a victim against any judgment
in favor of the victim in the civil action.
(2) If conviction in a criminal trial necessarily decides the issue of a defendant's liability for pecuniary damages of a victim, that issue is conclusively
determined as to the defendant if it is involved in a subsequent civil action.
(3) (a) (i) When a person is adjudged guilty of criminal activity which has
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it
may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution up to double the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim or
victims of the offense of which the defendant has pleaded guilty, is
convicted, or to the victim of any other criminal conduct admitted by
the defendant to the sentencing court unless the court in applying the
criteria in Subsection (3)(b) finds that restitution is inappropriate.
Whether the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of
the court record.
(ii) When a defendant has oeen extradited to this state under Title
77, Chapter 30, or has been transported at governmental expense
from one county to another within the state for the purpose of resolving pending criminal charges and is adjudged guilty of criminal activity in the county to which he has been returned, the court may, in
addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity
for the extradition or transportation. In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in Subsection
(3)(b). If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of
the court record. The court shall send a copy of its order of restitution
to the Division of Finance.
(b) In determining whether or not to order restitution, or restitution
which is complete, partial, or nominal, the court shall take into account:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
(c) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of
the restitution, the court shall at the time o£ sentencing allow him a full
hearing on the issue.
(4) As used in Subsection (3):
(a) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is.
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admitsresponsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.

(b) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes, but is not limited to, the money equivalent of
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses such
as earnings and medical expenses.
(c) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, including insured damages.
(d) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's
criminal activities.
(5)' (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances
in aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to
the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing
guidelines regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice.
(6) (a) If a defendant subject to Subsection (5) has been sentenced and committed to the Utah State Prison, the court may, within 120 days of the
date of commitment on its own motion, or at any time upon the recommendation of the Board of Pardons, recall the sentence and commitment
previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if
he had not previously been sentenced, so long as the new sentence is no
greater than the initial sentence nor less than the mandatory time prescribed by statute. The resentencing provided for in this section shall take
into consideration the sentencing guidelines established under this section by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing. Credit
shall be given for time served.
(b) The court shall state the reasons for its sentence choice on the
record at the time of sentencing. The court shall also inform the defendant as part of the sentence that if the defendant is releasedfromprison
he may be on parole for a period of ten years.
(c) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping,
rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse
of a child, the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and
if the charge is set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by
the defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant
shall be sentenced to the aggravated mandatory term in state prison. This
subsection takes precedence over any conflicting provision of law.

